Grading the Iraq Study Group's Report
By Joe Mariani (12/12/06)
The only conclusion a reasonable person can draw upon reading the report released by the much-touted Iraq Study Group is, "what a colossal waste of time." The last event that failed so miserably to live up to its own hype was Samuel L. Jackson's dismal failure, "Snakes on a Plane" (during which I openly rooted for the snakes). Watching James Baker and Lee Hamilton issuing fatuous, self-congratulatory statements about how their recommendations are the greatest ideas ever put on paper because they represent a consensus makes one wonder who the snakes really are this time.
The group, consisting of five Republicans (including former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor) and five Democrats, was sponsored by the United States Institute for Peace. By the nature of its deliberately bipartisan structure, it was not possible for the group to come up with anything but a compromise report-by-committee. When one takes into account the fact that the group was comprised of politicians, Beltway insiders and lawyers -- with not a member of the military or a real expert on Middle East affairs among them -- its real aim becomes clear.
The ISG was formed to come up with a purely political short-term solution to a problem that is neither short-term nor purely political in nature, which ultimately recommended sacrificing Iraq and Israel to save the careers of bureaucrats, administrators and politicians back home. It's an attempt to return to the "realpolitik" of yesteryear, when we weren't supposed to care that America-hating dictators controlled whole countries, as long as they made nice at the United Nations and kept the unrest out of the news. The fact that the members of the ISG agreed on the report's recommendations seems more important than the unfortunate reality that they're self-contradictory, defeatist and -- if implemented -- would affirm that the US is weak, vacillating and unable (or unwilling) to fulfill its commitments. It doesn't take a genius to see that this would have the same effect on our enemies as gasoline on a fire.
The way the ISG danced around the question of US troop withdrawal is typical of "recommendation by committee." The ISG analysis stated that its members are against setting a timetable for US withdrawal, but recommended that US combat troops should be out of Iraq by the first quarter of 2008. However, the ISG conceded that any withdrawal plan would be "subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground." And in order to promote security, the group recommended we "significantly increase" the number of American troops and military personnel in Iraq. So, did the ISG recommend increasing troops, decreasing troops, setting a withdrawal timetable or not? The answer is "E) All of the above."
Iraqi president Jalal Talabani condemned the ISG report, saying it "is not fair, is not just, and it contains some very dangerous articles which undermine the sovereignty of Iraq and the constitution." Isn't that the opposite effect from that which the ISG report was supposed to achieve? Or was the future of Iraq and its people not a factor in the group's calculations?
On the other hand, the Iranian government just loved the report. And why not? The ISG recommended that America beg help from Iran and its client state Syria to stop the violence in Iraq... which has been encouraged, funded and supplied by Iran and Syria from the beginning. The PLO also loved the report. What's not to love? In order to stop the violence between Sunni and Shi'a, the ISG stated that Israel must surrender the Golan Heights to Syria and guarantee the "right of return" to Palestinians -- in other words, Israelis must give those who have sworn to destroy their nation and kill them all free access. I'm surprised the ISG didn't recommend that the Israelis must supply Hizballah with better rockets while they were at it. Are there really Iraqis shooting at each other because Syria doesn't own the Golan Heights?
The ISG did offer a detailed, if somewhat pessimistic, analysis of the various problems Iraq faces, but it contained nothing that wasn't already available on the internet. They pointed out that only four of Iraq's eighteen provinces are "highly insecure" -- though they are home to roughly 40% of Iraq's population. The ISG also correctly noted that the violence in Baghdad is largely between Sunni and Shi'a, while the problems elsewhere are mostly attributable to Sunni groups, some of whom are cooperating with al-Qaeda and other terrorist elements. Criminal and gang activity contribute to the violence in both instances. This ought to come as a shock to the "mainstream" media, which usually portrays Iraq as though the entire country were involved in a civil war. One might as well consider racially-motivated violence between Los Angeles street gangs evidence that California is in a state of "civil war."
The ISG suggestions and recommendations generally fell into three categories: those which are already being done, those which would cause more problems than they would solve, and those which are pure fantasy. "The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades," is an example of the first category. In order to accomplish that goal, however, the ISG suggested we "significantly increase" the number of American troops and military personnel in Iraq. That may well fit into the second category of recommendations, as increasing the US footprint is likely to increase the Iraqi government's dependency on American troops.
The third category includes such finger-wagging admonishments to regional powers as, "Iran should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation," and "Syria should control its border with Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq." Well, of course they should. The ISG members must have imagined Iran's President Ahmadinejad slapping his forehead and exclaiming, "Well, gosh! Why didn't I think of that?" If the rulers of Iran and Syria wanted to respect Iraq's sovereignty and promote national reconciliation, they would have been doing so for the past three years, instead of funding and supplying religious gangsters like Moqtada al-Sadr and his Merry Mahdi Army.
Overall, the report would be a recipe for disaster if its recommendations were implemented. One suggestion reads: "If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq's security forces and to continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government." So, according to the ISG, all the enemy has to do is keep up the bombing to topple the Iraqi government by causing us to abandon it.
Aside from the ISG's ludicrous belief that what Iraqis are really concerned about is the fate of the Palestinians, its worst recommendation is an insistence on talks with Iran and Syria, forming a "support group" of local countries to help Iraq's democratic government. The members of the ISG seem not to understand that aside from Turkey, none of the countries in Iraq's neighborhood are even close to being democracies, and all have a vested interest in seeing a democratic Iraqi government -- and, by extension, the United States -- fail. The members of the ISG want us to believe a fantasy that the dictators and tyrants of those countries really want to help Iraq, but just don't know how.
Those who favor the sort of policy offered by the Baker-Hamilton commission's report consider themselves the "realists" of foreign affairs. The only real thing is the trouble in which we will find ourselves, should the kind of thinking that turned a blind eye to Saddam and his ilk all those years once again creep into control of our foreign policy.
http://guardian.blogdrive.com/archive/cm-12_cy-2006_m-12_d-12_y-2006_o-0.html
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