In Iraq, Chaos And Instability Have Their Uses
By Richard Davis (06/21/04)
Stability in Iraq is seen by many observers as key to President Bush’s reelection bid. But is it also key to winning the war on terror? Not necessarily. Iraq serves as both deterrent and opportunity. We tend to focus only on the latter--establishing a stable democracy--and become discouraged with every roadside bomb and two-bit fanatic. But if we would set aside our natural inclination for order we might discover that, in this war anyway, instability has its uses. Saddam Hussein didn’t like it, the Iraqis don’t like it, the world doesn’t like it. So far, so good.
With that in mind, the June 30 handover date is beginning to look like a stroke of genius, one of Bush’s smarter post-war calculations. Transferring sovereignty to the Iraqis before we’ve coerced order from disorder might produce some much-needed clarity in this young war, provided we get sufficiently out of the way (a major proviso). Let them define themselves. Chaos can be very good at sorting out good and bad. Good doesn’t always triumph--it hasn’t yet in that region, except perhaps among the Kurds--but Iraq should be viewed for what it is, one battle in a long struggle. Battles are learning experiences. They don’t have to be unqualified victories to contribute to a
successful war campaign.
Though the Bush Administration is chided for failing to prepare adequately for post-war Iraq, the chaos we’ve encountered there is our doing only in the sense that when we lifted the lid off the pot, that was what was inside. We weren’t greeted by liberated masses yearning to be free and democratic. They had other yearnings. This is a culture of revenge, not common law. A Pollyannaish attachment to democracy pales somewhat when there’s a hostile and fanatical Shia majority just down the road. One man, one vote, one mullah.
No doubt we could have done better. Reminders for next time: prevent looting, seal the borders, destroy all weapons, evict all unfriendly media, not just Geraldo. But even had there been some miracle plan--and has a critic suggested what that could have been?--the administration almost certainly would have been attacked for trying to impose “our” plan on the Iraqis. Given what’s actually on the ground there, it’s difficult to imagine any plan that would have brought us somewhere other than where we are right now, wherever that is.
As unnerving and murderous as instability can be, it might represent the best prescription for a region desperately needing a break from the status quo. The Islamic world is in a crisis of denial, and Iraq is casting a light on the underlying sociopathologies that subvert this culture and retard its development. This is global theater. Those grotesque pictures from Fallujah, along with the Berg beheading, bespeak a savagery and deep-seated psychoses far more fundamental and
systemic than anything photographed at Abu Ghraib. If Iraq implodes in a worst-case scenario that will be one more wakeup call for reform.
Whether anyone hears it is another matter. Reform is a long-term proposition in a culture so prone to hate, fanaticism and violence. Muslims have been working on it for centuries and, for the most part, failing. Iraq is probably not going to emerge as a democratic beacon to a region mired in the retrograde politics of tribe and religion. If that was our goal, and apparently it was at least one of them, then prepare for the worst. The last time Iraq experienced chaos and uncertainty it led to Saddam Hussein. In Palestine it led to Arafat. Across the Persian Gulf it led to the Taliban.
To the south is Saudia Arabia, to the east is Iran, to the west Syria. This isn’t a place to be overly optimistic.
Nevertheless, some optimism may be warranted. The process of reform is slow, but at least it’s underway, and our forces are in place to check any steep descents into purgatory. One thing about chaos, it preserves all potentialities. There are semi-hopeful signs that stirring the Middle Eastern pot may yet produce a palatable soup, if we don’t become impatient. The fact is, even with the Iraqi mess, and probably because of it, the Middle East today appears a much less closed and menacing place than it did two years ago. That’s progress.
Which isn’t to say that Iraq is about to become our 51st state. Iraqis hate us even more now than they did when Saddam was attaching French-made electrodes to their gonads. Their hatred feeds off the chaos, and that too works to our advantage. Insecurity can be a powerful motivator. Just the feeling of insecurity we get from watching Iraq’s insecurity motivates us to want to change presidents. It should compel the Iraqis to do something. Furthermore, the universal anti-Americanism produced by the chaos is like a national bonding agent insuring that whatever
Iraqis do will be their doing and not ours. That should speed reconstruction and contribute to its long-term legitimacy.
There is a tendency to view the Iraqi mess as our own deterrent, another Vietnam-like warning against any future interventions. That is foolish. Our primary objective, regardless of what happens in Iraq, is to strengthen our own security, not the Iraqis’, and we do that by deterring terrorist-supporting regimes. Democracy isn’t a threat to rulers whose subjects wouldn’t embrace it even if given the chance. But chaos is. Iraq is an example they don’t want to see replicated on their own territories, which is why we should keep that option visibly on the table. In the terrible calculus of war, the worse the Iraqi experience is overall, the better may be the deterrence.
Had the Iraqi people embraced liberation and democratic reforms--a bridge we should have known was too far--things could have been different. But that didn’t happen, and it probably isn’t going to happen. Success in building a stable democracy may elude us, and failure may indeed become an option in Iraq. It’s not going to help the president’s campaign, and no one’s going to be thrilled about it. But if properly managed, it might still be a victory in the war on terror.
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