C.I.A.? Clone Mueller
By Gary Aldrich (07/10/04)
President Bush will soon announce his choice for the new C.I.A. Director. One of his critics’ pet themes has been the U.S. Intelligence’s failure in predicting the 9/11 attacks. Soon the so-called nonpartisan 9/11 commission will weigh in with a critical report laying much blame on the F.B.I. and the C.I.A.
The F.B.I.’s fix is well under way. But what about the C.I.A.?
Its mind-boggling bureaucracy in the wooded countryside of Langley, Virginia took decades to create. It’s not subject to public scrutiny due to its highly secretive work. And remember, Bill Clinton’s dysfunctional circus used the C.I.A. and other key federal agencies as their social-agenda Petri dishes.
If Clinton-era touchy-feely sensitivity was all that was wrong at the C.I.A. we would be alright. Liberals' faddish agendas have a short lifespan regardless of what the Left and their friends in the media would have you believe. But the agency is facing a crisis. It’s too bogged down in bureaucracy and riddled with conflicting policies.
Federal agencies employ mostly hard-working, dedicated career professionals who overlook and maneuver around the chronic incompetence and confusion surrounding them. This is especially true if the White House supports meaningful change when it’s so obviously needed.
In order to support serious reforms, you first have to acknowledge the need. Let’s trust that George W. Bush is getting “behind-the-scenes” reports about what’s needed to improve the C.I.A. The public conversation about the need for significant change, though, has been largely absent. Without the public and media outcry for a return to high-quality work, it’s doubtful the president will be able to do more with a new director’s appointment than maintain the status quo.
Let’s look back at some of our efforts at agency reform. When the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded in 1986, it was found that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration had become a cumbersome bureaucracy that was evidently unable to ensure the safety of its astronauts while attending to other concerns like deadlines. Management reforms were initiated after the tragedy. But again, in 2003, another Shuttle tragedy happened and bureaucracy was again to blame. Serious reforms were ordered and implemented a second time.
Nobody in Washington, D.C. believed the replacement of top leadership at NASA alone would do the trick. So, how can we expect that a new C.I.A. Director will fix what’s wrong with the C.I.A.?
As another agency example, consider that F.B.I. Ruby Ridge was the start of a series of deadly or highly-embarrassing missteps for the F.B.I., a series which undermined public confidence in the agency.
Richard Jewell, wrongly identified as the Olympic bomber, was another serious public relations disaster. There was no compelling evidence that the F.B.I. leaked Jewell’s identity. Janet Reno’s Justice Department had turned the Olympic bombing in Atlanta, Georgia into a giant law enforcement “be-in,” with many local, state and federal agencies all fighting to get a piece of the action. In Washington though, perception trumps reality, and so the F.B.I. got the rap.
Add to that WACO, agents-turned-spies, and fingerprint snafus, as well as F.B.I. laboratory revelations. Obviously the F.B.I. needed both new leadership and significant reforms.
Louis Freeh made his exit and Robert Mueller took his place. Mueller was well-known as a reform-minded leader. In choosing Mueller, the president accomplished more than just changing the top leadership. Just changing out personnel without changing policy and adjusting attitude is not a “fix” of anything in this town. The president made the point especially to F.B.I. employees, who were put on notice that the changes were ordered by the president.
This boosted public confidence in the agency and mostly got the press off the F.B.I.’s back. But it also paved the way for successful reforms because the president had publicly acknowledged that reforms were needed. The best F.B.I. agents’ morale got a boost because the president understood their needs. They knew he would reward excellence by punishing incompetence and insolence. President Bush sent a message that he would fight bureaucratic attitudes – the bane of every federal employee who hopes to achieve greatness in his or her career.
Porter Goss, now Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee, has been named as a possible successor to George Tenet. But one wonders if Chairman Goss will approach his work with reform in mind. People stand out as boat-rockers because they have a track record with rhetoric to match. While it’s obvious that Chairman Goss has dedicated himself to his duties of oversight of the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies, my sources tell me that he’s shy – almost protective of the agency where he used to be called an “officer.” In fact, his official biography found on his congressional website mentions his time at the C.I.A. almost as an afterthought. We have no idea if he found the C.I.A. bureaucracy objectionable, if he observed incompetence, if the C.I.A. failed to rise to his expectations , or if the agency impressed him with perceived excellence.
Public confidence in the C.I.A. could be renewed if the president acknowledged a need for a thorough house-cleaning, then matched the rhetoric with the appointment of a director with a reputation for recognizing and abhorring incompetence.
The Senate confirmation process could underscore those goals. The C.I.A. needs a seeker of excellence, someone with proven political courage to carry out reforms that fundamentally protect our national security. Finally, the country needs somebody willing to deliver bad news to the boss, even if it’s not in his best political interests to do so. Chairman Porter Goss’s reputation appears flawless, but is he a reformer like Bob Mueller? The C.I.A. and the nation await that answer.
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