North Korean Nukes
By Ryan Walsh (10/05/04)
The debate: On one side stood a reckless unilateralist, arguing that the U.S. should “go it alone” in confronting the most dangerous regime in the world. On the other side, a man of cool rationale strongly demurred, pushing instead for a more international, multilateral coalition which would exert more influence on the rogue state and exude more legitimacy to the observing world.
So which candidate is which?
A favorite word employed by the left to summarize President Bush and his foreign policy is “cowboy,” denoting cocky stubbornness and a reckless disregard for international opinion. Yet, based on the candidates’ differing approaches to North Korea, one is led to believe that Senator John F. Kerry, not Bush, is the true cowboy. (And he’s even got the tan to prove it.)
During the debate, the senator claimed that a Kerry Administration would bring North Korea to its knees through direct, one-on-one negotiations. Moreover, Kerry accused the President of ignoring the growing threat of North Korea and, thus, allowing the regime to fully develop and equip nuclear weapons. But is this true?
In 1994, the Clinton Administration negotiated “an historic” deal with the North Koreans called the “Agreed Framework.” According to the treaty, North Korea would dismantle all of its nuclear weapons programs. In return, the government would receive two electricity-producing nuclear reactors and regular shipments of oil. To ensure that North Korea wouldn’t cheat, TV cameras were installed in various nuclear facilities.
For the remainder of the Clinton years, according to liberal talking points, the good people in the North Korean government gathered around in a circle, held hands, and sang “Kumbuya.” That is, until some bible-thumping, backwards idiot from Podunk assumed the U.S. presidency and labeled their regime a part of an “axis of evil.” Surprised and exasperated, Pyongyang immediately revamped its weapons program and began producing nukes.
Yet, contrary to this compelling scenario, all evidence suggests the North Koreans began secret production of nuclear materials way before Bush took office. In March 1999, the Department of Energy reported that North Korea had been running clandestine uranium-enrichment programs. Two years later, the CIA estimated that North Korea had produced two viable nuclear weapons.
Since then, the President’s diplomatic policy has been multilateral, six-party talks comprising the U.S., North Korea, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China. This approach brings to the table all nations with legitimate security concerns over the nuclear or non-nuclear status of North Korea. Yet Kerry would rather ignore our allies and “go it alone.” (Where have I heard that one before?)
Lost in the debate is the domestic half of Bush’s strategy toward North Korea, the basis of which is rooted in Ronald Reagan’s vision for the defense of America in an age of ballistic missiles. Captivated by the spirit of technology and inspired by science, Reagan announced the grand Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. This effort called for research into an anti-ballistic missile system—a missile “shield” that would render all nuclear missiles “impotent and obsolete.”
Last weekend, the Defense Department installed its fifth missile interceptor into a silo in Fort Greely, Alaska. When operational, this system could intercept most ballistic missiles shot over the Pacific Ocean, specifically from North Korea. Hardheaded realists acknowledge the improbability of a North Korean missile attack on the continental U.S., yet they fail to perceive the possibility of these weapons slipping into terrorist hands through the black market.
Critics also complain that missile defense is a response to a “threat that doesn’t now exist.” Yet, as National Review’s John J. Miller observes, “U.S. intelligence failures have generally made the error of underestimating the threat.” After the first Gulf War, U.S. intelligence was surprised to discover the extent to which Saddam had developed illegal weapons. When Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, admitted to selling nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya, and North Korea, the CIA shrugged and said, “Oops.” The list goes on and on.
Let’s just say for the sake of argument that the threat of a missile attack on the continental U.S. is non-existent. Will it be non-existent tomorrow? Still non-existent in a week? How about in a year?
The cost of implementing a functioning, effectual missile defense system may be in the billions, even trillions of dollars. But what is the cost in human lives of abandoning such a program in the face of such a threat?
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